Reserves Strategy before the Sterling Devaluation of 1967
As Schenk has argued, while Malaya was negotiating its independence in the mid1950s, the potential for monetary independence had a symbolic importance as an emblem of state-hood. 9 Despite the relatively speedy transition to independence on the peninsula, the governments of Singapore and the UK fought hard during the runup to Merdeka in 1957 to continue to have a common currency operate in the two territories. This reflected both economic imperatives (the close integration of 3 production and trade facilities) and political hopes for the eventual union of the two states. In the end a compromise was reached whereby the Malayan central bank, Bank Negara Malaysia (hereafter BNM) began operations in 1959, but the joint currency board continued to issue currency for the two territories.
When the joint currency board with Singapore was being planned, the Malaysian side argued strongly for the statutes to include the option of investing in assets other than sterling, specifically dollar assets. The Bank of England was powerfully opposed to the diversification of the currency reserve. As long as the M$ was pegged to sterling, holding dollar securities would introduce an exchange risk -if the US$ devalued then the reserves cover would be reduced. The Malayans, however, reasonably argued that this was a risk worth taking since sterling was more likely to be devalued, and sterling securities were prone to loss of value. 10 Moreover, the Bank of England's argument assumed that the M$ would keep its peg to sterling rather than follow a US$ devaluation. While the Bank of England wanted this to be a breaking point in the negotiations for a joint currency board, the Treasury and Colonial Office believed that the political as well as economic consequences of not achieving an agreement were too great to risk. 11 In the end, partly in recognition that the right to diversify the currency reserve would be more de jure than de facto, the Malaysians suggested that any investment in non-sterling assets would require unanimous agreement among the constituent members (including the UK through its control of Sarawak). The theoretical ability to diversify reserves, however, was viewed in Kuala Lumpur (KL) as an important political symbol of independence even as they made clear to the UK negotiators that 'the unanimity rule will ensure that nonsterling investment will be strictly limited in practice'. On 12 June 1967 separate currencies were finally introduced but the principle of currency union was not completely abandoned. To retain the advantages of integration each currency circulated at par in the other territory with periodic clearing back to the country of issue. The external exchange rates were also fixed at parity in terms of gold with sterling as the intervention currency. Singapore continued with a currency board and Malaysia kept a high ratio of reserve backing, so they retained elements of the currency board system. The minimum foreign exchange reserve was formally set at 80.59% of currency issued but the central bank publicly expressed its intention to maintain reserves well in excess of this limit. 17 Their 1969 return noted that the policy of the government and the BNM was to keep at least 100% gold and foreign exchange cover for the currency in circulation at all times. 18 In addition, the BNM was required to hold foreign reserves equal to 35% of its deposit liabilities, Chancellor reassured Tan that 'there was no question of devaluation' of sterling. 26 A few weeks later, however, Ismail notified the Bank of England that his goal was to reduce the sterling proportion of the currency reserves to two-thirds over the next six months, converting sterling at a rate of £3m per month to a total of £20m. 27 In the end, the diversification did not proceed as quickly as planned and by the eve of the devaluation the sterling proportion of total reserves was only 5% lower than in June (falling from 87% to 82%). As a result, Malaysia was caught out with large sterling holdings and the devaluation of 19 November cost the reserves M$250m (US$81.5m).
The Devaluation of Sterling November 1967
The sense of betrayal felt in KL after the sterling devaluation was intensified by the way that it exposed the differences between 'about a month back we had the feeling that the British Government would devaluate
[sic] and so we made up our minds and decided slowly to withdraw from the sterling reserve, and bought gold and transferred some to the US. We were in a difficult position and we had to do it gradually. If we did not plan our move, much more would have been lost'. 28 Again, the size of the reserves mitigated against quick diversification. IMF data show that Malaysia began to buy gold in August 1967 and by November had accumulated US$24.15m or 5% of reserves compared with US$1.05m in July or 0.2% of reserves. 29 Immediately after the devaluation, Singapore's Finance Minister Goh Keng Swee announced that he had reduced the sterling proportion of Singapore's reserves in the months running up to November. This took Malaysia, the Bank of England and the UK Treasury by surprise. In London, it had been assumed that about 80% of Singapore's foreign exchange reserves were held in sterling, but Goh revealed in The Straits Times that their reserves amounted to S$1251.6m of which only 50% was held in sterling, 41% in US dollars and the rest in DM, SwFr and Frfr. The diversification had been achieved by investing accruals to the reserves in non-sterling assets while leaving the bulk of sterling reserves in London untouched. Table 1 shows the position of Malaysia in comparison with its sterling neighbours. Diversification had begun in a small way by 1966 but was far behind Australia and Singapore. The government's holdings of about £20m were considered more secure since sales they were mainly British securities trading well below their purchase value. 31 Meanwhile, however, by the summer of 1968 a comprehensive system to manage the diversification of sterling reserves globally was being prepared that would force all official holders of sterling to commit themselves to minimum shares of sterling in their reserves, and Malaysia would play a key role in this solution.
Re-negotiating the sterling link 1968-72
For countries holding substantial sterling reserves, the impact of the collapse of the and by the end of September when the sterling agreement was signed these totals had risen to US$13.7m, DM41.75m, SFr15.12m, a total equivalent to about US$28m or £12m. 33 The increase in DM assets is particularly striking and related to the strength of the DM in international markets. In November 1968 Malaysia issued a DM25m bond and in February 1969, they issued a further DM40m bond. In July 1969 they also notified the bank of England that they would retain US$25m raised from a consortium of commercial banks in US$. 34 A further consortium package of US$50m
was raised in February 1971, and Choi warned the Bank of England that this would reduce the proportion of sterling in the reserves. 35 Reserves diversification was thus Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman visited London and was reluctantly favourable to the proposed agreements, remarking to the Australian High Commissioner that he had accepted the general proposals because 'we had to, we could not afford another devaluation, we lost so much the first time'. 37 This initial acquiescence was quickly reversed by Tan as the negotiations began in KL.
The British goal at the outset was to commit Malaysia to hold a minimum sterling proportion (MSP) in their official reserves of 73%, and also to get them to deposit 40-50% of their total non-sterling currency reserves with the BIS, where it would be available for the UK to borrow. 38 The MSP was much higher than the 57% agreed in February 1968, and was also higher than the proposed settlement with Singapore, but
London believed that their offer of an exchange guarantee for sterling reserves should be rewarded by Malaysia holding more sterling. The London negotiating brief noted that 'Malaysia may wish to continue with their agreed diversification programme…if they ask… we could not refuse to honour our earlier agreement. Nevertheless, we should seek to deter them from further diversification by pointing to the fact that the guarantee would be its equivalent and indeed would be more far-reaching and that…sterling investments would be likely to produce a better yield than those in 40 When the private negotiations began in earnest, however, he quickly showed his true colours. In common with other countries he refused to accept an obligation to pay interest for the guarantee, and this was finally abandoned in all negotiations at the beginning of September. More fundamentally, he cast doubt on the whole international monetary system, and predicted a US$ devaluation in the near future. He scolded the leading economies in the world, claiming that 'In Britain in particular and also in other developed countries, there had been a major failure of Governments resulting in labour indiscipline, continuous inflation, and general lack of confidence, which was now painfully justified, in any paper currencies.' On the Basle Agreement, 'The US$2b was quite inadequate and could easily be frittered away in a couple of years on maintaining the UK standard of living'. These serious criticisms of British policy were supported by Ismail, who was also present. Tan concluded that 'the scheme was not attractive to Malaysia and he would rather take a risk in diversifying further out of the sterling -and indeed perhaps also out of dollars, it might be better to hold reserves in tin or rubber equities than in any of the traditional reserve media including gold'. 41 Given the volatility of primary product prices, this In their telegrams back to London, Haslam and Fogarty both stressed the sensitivity in KL to the terms of any agreement concluded with Singapore.
Nevertheless, they agreed that Tan should not be promised terms as favourable as those agreed with Singapore. Goh and his colleagues in Singapore were also negotiating fiercely, and by mid-August it was still not clear that any agreement with Singapore would be reached by the deadline of the Basle meetings on 7-9 September.
Moreover, Singapore's total sterling holdings were much smaller than Malaysia, so
London could afford greater concessions to them which would prove impossible to replicate for Malaysia. Talks were resumed in KL on 21 August when Fogarty announced concessions on the charge (dropped), duration (3 years instead of 7), un-guaranteed proportion of sterling reserves (10%) and MSP (50% for government reserves plus provision for the currency board reserves to bring the total to 56%). Tan accepted these concessions except for the MSP, and countered with an offer of a firm public commitment to 30% overall, but a private agreement to maintain a working target of 50%. London could not accept such a low public MSP, which would set a precedent for other negotiations as well as potentially cost the reserves heavily, even if there was a private undertaking to maintain a higher proportion.
The Malaysia on the basis of the terms which their Cabinet has proposed'. 43 The Sterling
Negotiations Group in London deemed the failure to get agreement before 7
September 'unfortunate but not disastrous', and advised the team in KL to call Tan's bluff and suspend discussions for the time being. 44 Meanwhile, agreement with Singapore on a 40% MSP was concluded on 8 September (just in time to be reported at the Basle meeting) after Goh had learned of the terms agreed by Australia, which convinced him that no better deal was likely to be forthcoming. 45 Singapore did not have to give any private indication of working target since their actual sterling balances were close to their MSP level already.
In London, Ministers were fed up with Tan's intransigence and sought to force Malaysia to sign a sterling agreement by threatening to cut the British aid promised as an offset to the defence withdrawal from the region. A total of £25m had been promised to Malaysia of which only £7.15m was already committed, the rest due by would provoke retaliation against British businesses, goods, and nationals. The advice concluded that 'they [Malaysian government] are capable of acting emotionally and irrationally and would be quite likely to do so in these circumstances'. 46 The link to aid was quickly, if reluctantly, dropped because of the dangers of pushing Tan too far. Aid was not a bargaining chip. The possibility that
Malaysia maintained its assets in sterling in order to promote a good aid settlement is further undermined by the fact that Singapore had diversified unilaterally and with impunity in 1967.
By this time, the Bank's view was that 'We all feel very strongly that the Malaysians are outdoing the Australians in their intransigence'. 47 On 10 September,
London offered an agreement equivalent to the one concluded with Australia with a 40% MSP and a private agreement to keep a higher proportion. 48 In Malaysia's case the private target was the status quo, 50% plus allowance for the currency board (i.e. Figure 4 shows that the amount of sterling under guarantee increased for Singapore, but was quite stable for Malaysia.
As we shall see, Malaysia allowed their agreement to lapse in June 1972 after sterling floated and thus were never able to take advantage of the exchange guarantee. this as an 'economic conceit to imagine that Malaysia could appreciate against the US dollar'. 50 From early 1971 as the prospect for renewal of the sterling agreements approached, Ismail, Choi and Tan repeatedly complained about the weakness of the US$ and tried to press for an exchange guarantee in terms of gold. They also signalled early on that any renewal of the agreement would require the end of the oral commitment to a higher proportion than the formal MSP. 51 The proposed guarantee in terms of gold was abruptly dismissed when Jeremy Morse visited KL in March 1971 to canvas the possibility of a straight renewal of the agreements when they expired in September. 52 Tan asked for an interview with the Chancellor on the sterling agreements when he was in London, and they had a 40 minute discussion on the topic on 14 May. He again pressed for a gold guarantee given the turmoil in international currency markets in the spring of 1971 which had resulted in the revaluation of the DM. 53 The Chancellor 'made it clear that the UK could not move on this issue' because it would unpick the whole basis of the 34 sterling agreements and would add to uncertainty in international markets. 54 While most other sterling area countries were happy to acquiesce to the straight renewal, Malaysia tried to adapt the terms to their forecasted adjustments in the US$/gold rate.
At the end of July 1971 with two months left in the 1968 agreements, the Chancellor sent out invitations to all sterling countries to renew their agreements for a further two years with a unilateral and across the board reduction of 10% in all MSPs.
London believed the agreements helped confidence in sterling, but they did not want to repeat the bitter bilateral negotiations of 1968. For Malaysia, the Chancellor proposed reducing the private working target to 45% from 50%. Tan replied on the day before the Nixon shock that he was ready to accept the 36% MSP but he refused to renew the working target. 55 Eventually the Chancellor of the Exchequer had to
give way on this point. It was the easiest concession to make since it could be kept private, and thus not provide a precedent for other states to argue for concessions. 56 On 23 August in the midst of the turmoil of the Nixon shock and while exchange markets were closed, Tan was taken into hospital suffering from pneumonia, which delayed the final agreement. This, in turn, prolonged the conclusion of agreements with Singapore and Australia who were waiting to confirm that there would be no further concessions to Malaysia. The draft letters were finally sent to Tan in hospital at the start of September and agreed just in time on 7 September 1971. 57 The formal text retained the reference to Malaysia's aim to hold 'appreciably more' of their reserves in sterling, but this was no longer privately specified. To outside observers, therefore, it was a straight renewal. Nevertheless, London had to release Australia from their private working target for fear that the Australians would learn of the concession to Malaysia. As noted in the Treasury 'we could not afford the loss of Australian goodwill which would result if they learnt (and we must expect they will) of a concession made to Malaysia but not generalized to them'. 58 It is particularly curious given the sensitivity of Tan and Ismail to the value of the US$ that they concluded their second sterling agreement in September 1971 right after the Nixon Shock, but that the intervention rate for the guarantee was not a subject of discussion. In the event, because the $2.38 rate was explicitly referred to in the agreements rather than a par rate, the depreciation of the US$ against sterling from $2.40/£ to $2.60/£ under the Smithsonian agreements made the guarantee effectively inoperable. The sterling/US$ exchange rate could fall 8.5% before compensation would need to be paid. Tan wrote to the Chancellor to request a change in the trigger rate on 12 February 1972 in terms that suggest he expected the request to be uncontroversial. 59 Singapore went a step further and requested a formal review of the entire sterling agreement, with a view to abandoning it. For the British this posed considerable risk since if Singapore dropped the agreement, they would have to be ejected from the sterling area and exchange controls would need to be introduced between Singapore and Malaysia, which would be very difficult given the transferability of currencies. If, on the other hand, Malaysia followed Singapore in abrogating the agreement (which seemed likely) this would substantially reduce the proportion of total sterling covered by the agreements and thus mark 'the effective collapse of the structure of the Agreements'. 60 The Malaysians assumed that the trigger rate for the guarantee would be automatically adjusted, but they were firmly rebuffed in a letter from the Chancellor These two states also tried to bring the Australians with them in a joint request to change the intervention rate for the guarantee, but the latter had no sympathy for their cause. 67 Phillips, Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, professed to Bank of England officials that he was surprised by the approach from Singapore and Malaysia, and agreed to meet with them formally to discuss the issue (along with New Zealand), but reassured his London counterparts that 'so far as Singapore and Malaysia were concerned, he would continue to counsel moderation and patience on the lines he had done already.' 68 Bell's impression of opinion in Singapore, which convinced his masters in London, was that Goh was much more hostile to the sterling agreement per se than Tan, who wanted to continue the agreement but with the trigger rate adjusted. 69 The actual positions of Tan and Goh turned out to be the opposite once sterling floated.
A month after Barber's equivocal letter to Tan, sterling collapsed and had to be In order to maintain a pegged exchange rate both Malaysia and Singapore shifted their anchor from sterling to the US$, thus marking the end of their historic link to sterling.
In fact, they were quite late in taking this step as Australia and New Zealand had England reported that £40m was transferred by Malaysia to deposit at European commercial banks, half in Germany and a further £15m in Switzerland. 72 The evidence is a bit ambiguous but hints from the BNM at the time suggest that, despite his claims in parliament, Tan did not move substantially out of sterling before the float. 73 Despite the renewed sense of betrayal over the sterling float (or sink) so soon after re-assurances from London, the subsequent depreciation of sterling appears to have in guaranteed sterling assets, so they were paid £4.7m compensation. Table 2 shows the declining share of Malaysia in official holdings of sterling reserves. By the time they abrogated the agreement, which was received with relative equanimity in London, they held less than 4% of overseas sterling reserves compared with over 17% in 1966. This was mainly due to accumulations elsewhere, in particular oil producing countries like Kuwait and Nigeria at the end of the 1960s.
London's attention had by this time moved beyond Malaysia and the abrogation of the sterling agreement did not disrupt relations with London. 
Summary and Conclusions
The 
